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The Liberals’ Legacy: The Possibilities of Politics in Hard Economic Times
Abstract
One of the paradoxes of the Howard era of liberal reforms is that they appear to have been partly unsuccessful.
The scope of government measured by aggregate public spending has declined, in Australia, since the
mid-1990s. Yet taxation, welfare state transfers and public provision have all been subject to long-term
increase – since 1974, when the enthusiasm for cutbacks and altered expectations took hold. This anomaly
suggests that the ‘possibilities of politics’ have not been extinguished by economic rationalism; however the
resilience of the democratic impulse nonetheless coincides with the unarguable dismantlement of past
institutional achievements associated with the ‘Australian settlement’, particularly the system of compulsory
arbitration and centralized wage-fixation.
This paper documents and explores both sides of the implied conundrum. It notes the long-term expansion of
anti-liberal, extra-market modes of governance (which Australia shares with all other rich societies). But it
cautiously concludes this will not be sufficient to out-weigh the effects of the renunciation of specifically
antipodean state experiments. This conclusion has implications for theoretical understandings of politics just
as controversial as the divisive politics that characterized the 1996-2007 era.
This article is available in Journal of Economic and Social Policy: http://epubs.scu.edu.au/jesp/vol13/iss1/5
Introduction 
 
Liberals are, naturally, perturbed by the rise in state activity that has characterized all 
advanced capitalist countries for the past hundred years. Public spending as a 
proportion of GDP in the wealthy countries was about 10 percent a century ago; it is 
now over 40 percent (the OECD average) and does not appear to be in general 
structural retreat. There are very few countries where the current level of public 
spending is lower than in 1974 when the neo-liberal celebration of government 
cutbacks was re-activated.1 That this phenomenon has persisted even where it has 
been most fiercely resisted suggests that it is a structural phenomenon. The most 
robust explanation for it was provided by the conservative German political 
economist Adolph Wagner in the 1880s. He argued that as societies become 
wealthier, more industrialized and more urbanized, the range of problems requiring 
public rather than private resolution expands more rapidly than total activity thus 
generating steadily rising public expenditures and taxation. Irrespective of the will of 
particular politicians and parties, technological, demographic and democratic 
pressures contribute to permanent, if unintended, shifts in the nature of politics. 
 
Among the effects of the long-term expansion of government is that it confounds the 
arguments of libertarians and anarchists and adherents to public choice theory (see 
Hindmoor 2006). That is, increasing demand for public activity in rich societies is 
being matched by a steady increase in the capacity of public authority to assume, 
define and discharge responsibilities assigned to it. This applies equally when the 
mandate is only cautiously transmitted, or with low popular expectations. There is 
even a propensity for political institutions to evolve in directions that allow them to 
take on and complete tasks that were no part of their original mandate (Hodgson 
2000). While there have been plenty of political failures, and attempts to politically 
achieve outcomes which probably should not be attempted and problems which are 
intractably resistant to collective resolution, the history of the twentieth century, and 
that includes experience in the globalization period since the mid-1970s, is one of 
successful development, maintenance and embellishment of state capacity. The 
disappointments of politics do not define politics. Though rational choice writers have 
attributed to politics endemic weaknesses which warrant the generic concept ‘state 
failure’ (embracing rent-seeking, ‘pork-barrelling’, unanticipated consequences and 
budget maximizing behaviour of public servants and bureaucracies), their cynicism 
has not been reflected in the range of functions political institutions have 
encompassed. Nor is it evident in the political will that is recurrently activated. 
Everywhere, the state does more, and more efficaciously, than it did during the 
heyday of Keynesianism, the mixed economy and postwar enthusiasm for state-
building. 
Evidence: the expanding possibilities of politics? 
 
Since 1974 public spending has increased by more than 20 percent in the OECD as a 
whole (from 33 percent of GDP to 40 percent), the figure for Australia being 
somewhat less (from 30 percent of GDP to 34 percent). The situation is even more  
                                                 
1
 Only Ireland, Norway and the Netherlands among OECD countries. 
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dramatic with respect to taxation collections; the increase is from 33 percent in the 
early 1970s to 38 percent now for the OECD, but from 28 percent to 35 percent for 
Australia (a 25 percent increase). Much was made during the 2004 federal election 
campaign of the Howard government having become the highest-taxing government 
in Australia’s history – though this can also be said of every other government in 
Australia’s history – and it presumably provided the motive for the extravagant 
taxation reduction pledges from both sides during the 2007 campaign. Importantly, 
however, the ‘highest ever’ taxation is not reflected in public spending – see Table 1. 
 
 
 
Table 1  Growth of government in Australia 
 
Taxation receipts as percent of GDP 
   
Howard period 1996-2007 36.1 (12-year average) 
Hawke/Keating period 1983-1995 34.8 (13-year average) 
Fraser period 1976-1982 30.5 ( 7-year average) 
Whitlam period 1973-1975 28.1 ( 3-year average) 
 1970-1973 25.0 
 1960 24.4 
Total public spending as percent of GDP 
   
Howard period 1996-2007 35.2 (12-year average) 
Hawke/Keating period 1983-1995 38.5 (13-year average 
Fraser period 1976-1982 34.6 ( 7-year average) 
Whitlam period 1973-1975 31.0 ( 3-year average 
 1970-1973 23.5 
 1960 21.2 
 
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook no.84, December 2008, pp.273-274; OECD 
Historical Statistics 1970-2000 Paris 2001, pp.67-68; OECD Historical Statistics 
1960-1995 Paris 1997, p.72. 
 
 
 
Though Australia is not distinctive with respect to the growth of government, which 
may also be interpreted as a growth in the capacities of the state and political 
possibilities, since the beginning of the twentieth century Australia shifted from 
having the biggest government in spending terms in the developed world to almost the 
smallest (see Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Tables 2 and 3). 
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Table 2:  Size of government and taxation 2008-2009 
   in the OECD and selected countries – as percent of GDP 
 
GOVERNMENT OUTLAYS  TAXATION REVENUES  
    
France 53.3 Norway 58.9 
Sweden 52.2 Sweden 52.7 
UK 48.8 France 49.4 
Norway 45.4 Germany 43.0 
Germany 44.0 UK 42.4 
OECD av.  42.2 OECD av.  38.1 
USA 39.2 Australia 35.5 
Australia 35.0 USA 33.1 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook no.84, December 2008, pp.273-274. 
 
Table 2 confirms Australia as a small government nation, with both public spending 
and taxation receipts (all levels of government combined) below the OECD average. 
Even the US and Japanese governments now spend a bigger share of GDP than 
Australia’s. Despite a slowing in the rate of increase in most countries, there is no 
evidence of a general retreat from the growth of government even in the most liberal, 
small government nations. The steady increase in prosperity in most nations, 
furthermore, has not been impeded by the even steadier increase in taxation revenues, 
not excluding direct taxes and corporate taxation (Hobson 2003). 
 
Some grounds exist for the following conclusions: (a) that liberalism’s efforts to roll 
back the state have been less effective than hoped (that is, the neo-liberal project has 
to some extent failed); (b) that the possibilities of politics have not been eroded in 
recent times (by liberal ‘reformers’ or by the exigencies of globalization); (c) that the 
imperatives of competition are less urgent than contemporary discourse maintains; (d) 
that the recent prosperity has depended on the ‘social capital’ that governments are 
obliged (by electoral or demographic pressure) to provide; and (e) that political and 
democratic arrangements are more effective than critics on the right and left have 
tended to assert (or, to put this last point another way, that social democratic 
ambitions are being realized to a far greater extent than either intellectuals or 
protagonists would have imagined). 
 
Figures 1 and 2 suggest the downturn in public activity that seemed to emerge in the 
’nineties has faltered, and has probably been reversed, since. Taxation revenues have 
behaved similarly with collections increasing more slowly than in the 1960s and 
1970s (exemplifying the difficulties of politicization) but not declining (Figure 3). 
Liberalism in Australia has been effective in keeping the realm of politics more 
constricted than elsewhere. Despite recurrent and increasingly implausible claims that 
we are over-taxed, it is surely obvious that the much-noted shortfalls in infrastructure 
provision (especially with respect to water, energy, transport and health) in every state 
is caused by Australia’s unnecessarily low taxation. A wage earner on average weekly 
earnings (that is $1000 per week) pays only 22 percent in income tax, while one with  
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a taxable income of twice that figure ($104 000 per year) pays less than 30 percent of 
it directly in income tax (in 2008). 
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Figure 1: Growth of government 1870-2010 
  Public spending as percent of GDP in 7 countries with 17-country*  
 average 
 
 
The repeated budget surpluses were also senseless with a contractionary excess of 
revenue collections over spending during the Howard years amounting, according to 
recent Budget Papers, to over $50 billion – enough to have built, for example, fully-
funded Very Fast Trains from Sydney to Melbourne and Sydney to Brisbane with 
enough left over to have boosted state health budgets in each state each year by 5 or 6 
percent.2 
                                                 
2
 OECD and Treasury/ABS sources conflict on the level of public investment in Australia. It seems to 
be between 1 and 2 percent of GDP currently, as for most of the past thirty years. Almost $40 billion in 
extra revenue would be available for public infrastructure if Australian taxation were increased by 
about 3 percent of GDP, that is, to about the OECD average. The additional taxation impost would be 
less than $4000 per taxpayer per year; with Australia still a low-tax nation. OECD experience indicates 
that about 4.5 percent of GDP annually devoted to public infrastructure will eliminate unemployment 
(Boreham, Dow & Leet 1999, pp.138-139). 
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Figure 2: Public sector spending 1960-2010 
OECD and Australia compared, percent of GDP 
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Figure 3: Taxation receipts 1960-2010 
OECD and Australia compared, percent of GDP 
 
Repayment of public debt, which the bond-holders did not want repaid, seems poor 
compensation for the wealth- and employment-generating potential of that 
infrastructure investment foregone during the period. Public amenities are in crisis 
everywhere; yet there exists profligate private consumption (often funded by private 
indebtedness) alongside under-investment, public decay, lack of maintenance and real 
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need. So taxes have increased, but not sufficiently to avert tragic and needless 
deficiencies in the quality of facilities which can only be provided collectively. 
Table 3:  Social security transfers 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Austria 15.4 17.9 18.8 18.3 
Germany 13.1 16.5 17.8 18.0 
France 14.9 17.0 18.1 18.0 
Italy 13.3 14.7 16.7 17.0 
Greece 7.6 13.5 15.2 16.8 
Poland    16.4 
Denmark 11.0 16.6 18.9 16.0 
Finland 7.5 13.1 20.0 15.9 
Belgium 12.2 18.0 16.3 15.5 
Sweden 12.0 18.3 20.7 15.0 
Portugal 3.8 10.8 12.2 13.6 
Luxembourg 14.7  15.3 13.6 
Norway 13.2 12.7 15.7 13.1 
UK 9.0 13.3 14.3 13.0 
Czech Republic   11.4 12.8 
OECD av. 9.3 12.9 13.2 12.5 
Slovak Republic   13.6 12.3 
USA 8.3 11.0 12.6 12.4 
Spain 9.2 15.5 15.0 11.9 
Switzerland 8.7 13.4 10.9 11.9 
Netherlands 18.3 26.7 19.2 11.3 
Canada 7.2 10.3 13.1 11.2 
Japan 4.9 11.0 8.5 10.7 
Ireland 9.6 15.5 11.3 8.8 
Australia 4.1 7.1 8.5 8.5 
Korea 0.8 1.4 2.5 3.5 
Mexico   1.3 1.7 
 
 
OECD Historical Statistics 1970-2000. Paris 2001, p.67; and OECD in figures 2008, 
pp.56-57. 
 
Social security transfers, probably the most unloved of all public outlays among 
liberals, have increased more rapidly than other (non-social) expenditures, by more 
than 40 percent in the OECD countries, more than doubling in Australia since the 
1970s. This shift may be counter-intuitive but it is indicative of altered public 
priorities, even if disparaged by policy elites. More people get more of their income in 
the form of transfers based on citizenship entitlements than ever before. The trend is 
also a century old. And, as much of it is payment to middle class and wealthy citizens 
in the form of family allowances and child care subsidies, demographic circumstances 
suggest it is likely to continue. Most social transfers are income maintenance, 
indicating that an increasing proportion of the population receives an increasing 
portion of its income in a form unrelated to its members’ productive contributions 
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(see the comprehensive discussions in Castles 2004, ch.2; Castles 2007; Swank 2003; 
Lindert 2004, chs 1 & 2). 
 
In Australia, as elsewhere, the welfare state is decreasingly a re-distributive state and 
increasingly one which provides decommodified services to citizens according to the 
principle of universal entitlement. Social expenditures, much higher than social 
security transfers, are currently over 20 percent of GDP in OECD countries (OECD 
2008b; see also Fig.4). 
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Figure 4 Social transfers 1900-2000 
 Welfare, unemployment benefits, pensions, public health & housing 
 subsidies7 OECD countries with 21-country average* – percent of GDP 
 
There is reason to contend that these unheralded changes in modern societies are 
structural, beyond the scope of deliberation and articulated political demands (see Hay 
2006). Adolph Wagner would not be surprised by the fact that there is higher transfer 
spending and non-market provision in rich countries. This perhaps dissipates the 
apparent paradox that most countries spend more on social transfers than everything 
else.3 Tax-funded spending does not pay for defence or infrastructure or subsidies to 
                                                 
3
 Recent federal budgets show that health and social security expenditures together account for almost 
60 percent of the Commonwealth Government’s outlays. 
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industry in the main (see Obinger & Zohlnhöfer 2007), but for extra-market provision 
for people who do not really need it. This creates an egalitarian impulse. Once we add 
in spending on urban amenity and other aspects of public provision which also 
contribute to real incomes, we can appreciate that the ‘law of expanding state 
activity’, as Wagner called it, points to a broader phenomenon: in wealthy and 
complex societies, not only is more done under political auspices but the limitations 
that are commonly posited concerning the capacities of politics are continually being 
transcended. 
 
The important intellectual point is that intense controversy persists between the major 
academic traditions that have attempted to account for, interpret, extrapolate from and 
provide the rationale for government and politics. The next section draws attention to 
the contrasting theoretical paradigms on the causal factors influencing the role of 
politics offered by Marxism and neo-Weberianism. 
Politics or markets? 
 
Marxism, as is well known, has long proclaimed the impotence of genuinely 
democratic or deliberative politics in capitalist societies by virtue of the need for the 
state to accede to business, the market and the imperatives of capital accumulation 
which is itself under undemocratic control.4 Consequently, it follows, the polity will 
typically succumb to liberal demands for retreat – except, arguably, during 
exceptional periods, such as the postwar years, when ‘class compromises’, ‘social 
settlements’ and similar compacts can be negotiated to secure the compliance of 
sectors of the populace with uncharacteristic bargaining power which might otherwise 
be sufficiently mobilized to threaten the stability of the system qua economy. A 
Fordist era of tolerance for social and political developments, even experiments, was 
understood to have prevailed from 1945 to 1975; but is now (since the mid-1970s) 
being superseded (see Jessop 2002; Jessop & Sum 2006; Boyer & Saillard 1995). By 
insisting that the logic of accumulation inevitably overrides the logic of democratic 
politics, Marxism has allowed itself to become much more pessimistic with respect to 
the progressive possibilities of politics than its internal analysis required (see Dow 
1998). This fatalistic perspective on democracy was the analogue of liberalism’s: 
where liberalism maintained that the polity should not be able to assume too many 
responsibilities even if demanded by the polity, Marxism insisted it could not.5 
 
In general, the more conservative (but defiantly anti-liberal) theories of politics 
(especially neo-Weberian writings, commonly oriented to criticizing the conventional 
wisdom and political immobilism associated with globalization) have a better 
                                                 
4
 For a recent restatement of this position and the debate around it, see Nelson 2006. The most 
influential formulations derive from the Manifesto’s assertion, in 1848, that ‘The executive of the 
modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’. 
 
5
 An alternative Marxist position, that institutional and political and democratic criteria would 
increasingly be needed for sound economic performance as capitalist accumulation became more 
organized and less competitive, more productive and less in thrall to market modes of calculation, more 
monopolistic and less atomistic, more negotiated and less self-regulating, has been generally ignored 
by Marxist orthodoxy. The transition from markets to politics – as competing auspices for control of 
economic activity – has rarely been countenanced; and the implications of managed capitalism, either 
in the postwar years or now, have been scarcely examined from within mainstream Marxism. 
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purchase on the understanding of contemporary politics (see Weiss 1997; Weiss 2003; 
Saul 2005; Gray 1998; Reinert 2007). Arguably, though, they are too optimistic, too 
unwilling to anticipate the structural obstacles to politicization of the economy. 
 
Optimism in political theory really stems from the Aristotelian tradition, which then 
continued through Machiavelli, Hegel, civic republicanism, Weber and modern 
statists (see Wolin 2004). The tradition holds that politics is our fate, that humans 
cannot live in the absence of collective decisions, that resolving the innumerable 
difficulties of political society is what makes politics a noble venture. For 
Machiavelli, political competences (virtù) can be deployed, and have been, to 
overcome the risks, uncertainties and capriciousness (fortuna) that would otherwise 
engulf us. Hence we build walls and armies to repel invaders, viaducts to irrigate and 
render habitable under-endowed areas, and arts, culture, architecture, science and 
learning to create skills and an ambience to tip the balance of human fate within a 
potentially harsh environment in the direction of civility. Hegel conceived of a state 
compelled to recreate stability in the face of the Enlightenment’s unleashing of private 
and amoral egoism. American civic republicans wanted a republic able to protect 
vulnerable citizens and living standards from the ravishments and excesses of 
unrestrained commerce. And Weber (1918), while acknowledging that politics would 
always be a ‘slow boring of hard boards’, hoped for the passion that would allow 
politically active people to ‘reach out for the impossible’, even if sober evaluation 
predicted little success. He was also a member (with Friedrich List, Adolph Wagner 
and Joseph Schumpeter) of the German ‘Historical School’ of economists who 
protested that economic progress (in terms of living standards for the populace, 
longevity for business, stability for the nation) would not be maximized by 
application of abstract principles such as subservience to market forces. 
 
So contemporary conservatives are distressed by those policy-makers and institutions 
(especially international institutions) and doctrines which proclaim the inevitability 
and unstoppability of de-politicization, de-regulation and de-democratization. They 
have a long record of philosophizing about how humans can control their destiny. 
Aware of the difficulties of creating political institutions well-fitted to particular 
political tasks, and the mentality required for effective politics, they are reluctant to 
relinquish them to precocious but inexperienced impulses. In Australia, conservatives 
in the National Party and in the churches seem especially sensitive to this wholly 
respectable tradition, at least a millennium old, of hostility to ‘progress at any price’ 
(see also Gray 2007). 
 
Modern notions of state capacity, the ability of the polity to secure outcomes, 
according to political principles, which would not otherwise have been possible, have 
generally evolved from within conservative traditions of analysis. Rejecting 
Marxism’s refusal to embrace activist political programmes, as well as liberalism’s 
confidence in liberalization, neo-Weberians have re-engaged the discourse that was 
central to Machiavelli. Political will and morality and cleverness and national 
autonomy are central and should be seen as inviolable. We, members of a polity, are 
not only entitled, but able, to develop political principles and criteria for the initiation 
of public activity, despite the discursive hegemony of liberalism and the pressures of 
globalization. The resulting public policy necessitates the construction of dedicated 
institutions, including extra-parliamentary institutions with a permanent charter to 
develop pre-emptive policy competences, whereby outcome-oriented (not process-
9
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driven) policy achievements and citizen entitlements can be ‘embedded’ and external 
pressures resisted. Such state capacity need not be particularly ‘statist’ in the sense 
that power or authority is wantonly ceded to the state;6 indeed the contemporary 
enthusiasm for ‘governance’ studies is a register of the extent to which governments 
and public authorities do not always govern alone. 
 
Michael Mann was among the first of the neo-Weberians to articulate a modern 
conception of state capacity (1984; 1993, pp. 54-63). Distinguishing between the 
‘despotic’ and ‘infrastructural’ power of the state, his analysis suggests that the 
important capacities of a polity today are not the coercive features which concern 
liberals but the infrastructures and institutions which allow effective law-making, 
taxation and administration (including the capacity to coordinate non-state actors 
whose legitimate activity may cause problems which the polity is called upon to 
resolve). 
 
Infrastructural power has evolved throughout the past hundred years from 
developmental capacities (state provision of physical infrastructure) characteristic of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the economic management 
capabilities associated with Keynesianism and the counter-cyclical policy 
interventions of the postwar period, to the more social democratic capacities 
(including cross-subsidization, decommodification, democratization of decision-
making, and politicization of the economy that has sporadically emerged over the last 
fifty or sixty years). It is an unavoidable feature of the post-Enlightenment firmament 
that these grand themes (the struggle for and against political competence, resistance 
to or endorsement of market modes of governance, domestic autonomy vs 
undeliberated relegation to whatever status is decreed by a global division of labour) 
are recurrently played out. The divergence between European and Anglo-American 
political preferences (in contemporary parlance between liberal-market economies 
and social-market economies) is an instructive contemporary instance (see Judt 2005, 
ch.11; Pontusson 2005, ch.2).  
 
The encounter with liberalism has become steadily more strident as this progression 
has unfolded. And it is a process that has been more effectively consummated in some 
countries than in Australia (see Boreham et al. 1999, ch.5). The renunciations of 
social democratic principle associated with Bob Hawke in 1984 and Kevin Rudd a 
quarter-century later is a testament to the resilience of liberal institutions and their 
stranglehold on policy. 
 
Liberalism and anti-liberalism in Australia  
 
The question, then, is whether what can be called the ‘possibilities of politics’ are as 
robust in Australia as evidence of growth of government and the state capacity writers 
                                                 
6
 There is a difficulty of nomenclature: many of those here labelled Weberians or neo-Weberians might 
resist the appellation. Some might not see themselves as conservatives (which is not here used 
derogatorily); some definitely resist the label statist. Other terms such as corporatist, institutionalist, 
communitarian, protectionist, even neo-mercantilist have been used to categorize writers who celebrate 
the ‘embeddedness’ of economic activity and who therefore do not celebrate flexibility or 
competitiveness or efficiency or rationality when something more substantively precious is lost. 
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suggest or if they have been extinguished by the ‘economic reforms’ of the period 
since 1996 (or earlier at the hands of the liberals in the Labor Party). Should, on 
balance, liberals be disappointed by the persistence of a growing public realm, 
accepting that this is not an impediment to strong economic performance? Or should 
they be pleased with their record – especially their successful shifting of some 
taxation from direct to indirect with the GST in 2000 and, more so, the unarguable 
dismantlement of institutional accomplishments associated with the ‘Australian 
settlement’, the system of compulsory industrial arbitration and centralized wage-
fixation? 
 
The answer to this conundrum obviously depends on how we evaluate arbitration. 
Popular discourse in 2005 presented the ‘Work Choices’ legislation as the overdue 
supersession of redundant, anachronistic institutional features bequeathed from the 
past and suited, if at all, only to an era when international competitiveness was 
unimportant, labour was comparatively strong and well-protected, and the state was 
deeply-implicated in the imperatives of national development. A hundred years after 
1907, the situation had changed, so the argument went, and the polity could no longer 
afford to defy market rationality by giving organized labour a platform and a leverage 
that was never legitimate, nor to permit inflexibilities in the labour market borne of 
protectionist sentiment and uninnovative satisfaction with a cosseted national 
economy. 
 
From this viewpoint the most desirable aspect of centralized wage-fixing is its ability 
to allow the transmission of productivity increases from the sectors where they were 
generated to everyone else (that is, through National Wage Cases and ‘flow-ons’ 
using the criterion of comparative wage justice). Any other basis for wage 
adjustments becomes cumulatively more inegalitarian and unjust. Every nation has an 
obligation to develop institutions which permit this (anti-liberal) capacity and the 
Australian solution was close to brilliant – producing one of the world’s most equal 
income distributions, without any detrimental impact on national performance or 
living standards and arguably more efficacious than similar arrangements in other 
countries with centralized systems like Sweden. We developed mechanisms where 
labour, the element in production which can never be treated on the basis of 
contractual parity, was able to demand that employers justify their decisions (most 
importantly with respect to wages but also, and imaginably, with respect to decisions 
concerning investment, re-investment and dis-investment) before a tribunal 
specifically mandated for the purpose. 
 
Although liberal purists would insist that the constitutional provision granting 
Commonwealth responsibility for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
did not warrant arbitral powers in the form that eventuated, it was an institutional 
arrangement with considerable, even formidable, effectiveness. No doubt the complex 
award structure was an inconvenience to employers, but awards were not integral to 
the system and, in any case, flexibility in employment is not regarded as desirable 
anywhere outside the blinkered purview of liberalism. Interventionists argue, too, that 
the rigidities cannot be held responsible for economic weakness, as the highpoint of 
arbitration coincided with Australian prosperity, affirming the Keynesian correlation 
between high (and equally-distributed) wage incomes and high levels of economic 
activity. And when unusual difficulties arose in the form of simultaneous 
unemployment and inflation, from the mid-1970s, it was the capacity of the system to 
11
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oversee a defacto incomes policy that ultimately dealt with the distributive conflicts 
without significant industrial or social disruption (Dow & Lafferty 2007). 
 
Periodic campaigns for tax reductions through the 1980s appear to have bordered on 
the hysterical. But we are now inclined to acknowledge that low taxes in the current 
conjuncture have been hugely irresponsible; and we would all be more affluent, more 
secure and more environmentally viable if some of the abundant private purchasing 
power were siphoned off to the public realm (see Stretton 2005, pp. 249-255). 
 
Liberals also claim that economic performance is the great achievement of the past 
twelve years, presumably based on high incomes and lower unemployment. High 
incomes of course somewhat fortuitously pushed Australia into the class of affluent 
nations, out-weighing for the moment the cascading shortfalls in public infrastructure. 
However not all bodies of critical analytical opinion share the liberals’ insouciance 
towards longer working hours and insecure (and low-quality) work and increasing 
inequality. At 1722 hours worked per year on average, we work almost 10 percent 
fewer hours than Americans, but about 10 percent more than the British, and 160 
hours per year more than the Swedes (OECD 2008c, p. 353). Working hours are 
falling more slowly than in most other wealthy countries. We have become in the past 
two decades one of the most inegalitarian countries in the OECD after scoring 
relatively well until the late 1970s (UNDP 2007, p. 281).7 These are not minor 
blemishes on an otherwise favourable social condition; they seem to be signs of 
unsustainable prosperity which excessive private debt or continuing financial 
disruption or the end of the current minerals boom or regional decline could readily 
disorder. 
 
The most worrying feature of the policy hubris of the Howard years (and earlier) 
concerned unemployment. To champion the ‘best unemployment figures for over 
thirty years’ was to admit that Australia experienced above-OECD-average 
unemployment for thirty years, once again without incurring liberals’ discomfort (see 
Table 4, col.1). Over 4 percent unemployment is still mass unemployment, 
particularly as it is measured more invidiously than in the 1930s. Australia has 
evolved a ‘mode of regulation’ which precludes deliberative policy attention to 
structural change or the resulting unemployment. 
 
Table 4: Australia’s unemployment by periods 
 
1974-2004 1973-1975 1976-1982 1983-1996 1997-2007 
7.2 3.2 6.5 8.6 6.2 
 
Australia 
OECD 6.9 3.5 5.9 7.7 6.6 
 
  
 Sources: OECD Economic Outlook no.82, December 2007, pp. 233-234; OECD 
Historical Statistics 1960-1995 Paris 1997, p. 45; OECD Historical Statistics 
1970-2000 Paris 2002, p. 42. 
 
                                                 
7
 Despite the share for the bottom 60 percent of income earners improving during all through 1980s and 
1990s – from 30.4 percent  in the 1970s, to 33.0 percent in the 1980s, to 35.1 percent in the 1990s. 
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This poor record is largely attributable to global restructuring and a crisis in 
manufacturing; Australia has experienced faster industrial decline from a lower base 
than any other nation (OECD 2001, pp. 40-41). Furthermore this was a period of 
above-OECD-average economic growth, so either growth in general does not lower 
unemployment or it does not do so in Australia. The refusal to engineer appropriate 
policy responses, or the lack of state capacity in this area, is the proximate cause of the 
miserable record on unemployment. It is disingenuous to celebrate recent falls in 
unemployment when for three decades the liberal policy elite elected to not even address 
the problem.8 It is hardly alarmist to suppose that second and third generation 
unemployment creates problems that resonate and fester for generations. Sustained 
unemployment, too, is an indication that incomes, production and living standards in this 
period were lower than they could have been. On the gap between actual and potential 
quality of life, Australia has performed badly. Even the OECD now reckons inequality 
as detrimental to well-being (2006, p. 21). And the available survey evidence suggests 
real community discontent (Pusey & Turnbull 2005). 
It is difficult accept, therefore, that economic reform led to prosperity any more than 
that the gleeful assault on noble institutions was honourable or necessary or desirable. 
Once again, we have a ‘lucky economy’, but it’s not an ‘international template’, nor 
an economic miracle, nor the foundation for real wealth creation. Some intractable 
problems remain unaddressed and we’ve lost certain capacities for transmitting wealth 
that we once had. 
Conclusion 
 
Renunciation of distinctively antipodean state experiments in recent times seems more 
damaging to national solidarity and future prospects than the steadily rising scope for 
political intervention can be a prophylactic against it. This essay has argued that 
political science and political economy traditions attribute growth of taxation-
financed public activity and state capacity to demands that emerge inexorably from 
conditions in affluent societies, even when they are disparaged by forces hostile to the 
democratic impulse. 
 
The financial crisis since 2007 may foreshadow an imminent re-engagement with the 
Keynesian and institution-building concerns that marked the optimism of the post-
1945 period. But the legacy of liberalism in Australia suggests otherwise. The polity 
is not well-positioned (intellectually or financially) to exploit the structural conditions 
which render liberal priorities anachronistic. 
 
A ‘structural maturity’ thesis seems to proffer reasons for unexpected political 
challenges, accomplishments and potentials. First, if we examine the advanced 
economies, we see that growth transforms the relation between markets and politics, 
                                                 
8
 Liberals err, too, on the range of policies they are prepared to accept. Reserve Bank independence 
presumes that interest rate policy determines many other important macroeconomic aggregates. This has 
been seriously disputed for many decades by Keynesians who have argued that monetary policy is worse 
than useless at controlling production and employment; it can only do damage, never produce an expansion 
in economic activity, nor be used in a counter-cyclical way. John Kenneth Galbraith once concluded that 
sound economic management capacities depend on reducing ‘for all time’ the use of monetary policy 
(1974, p. 308). He affirmed the evaluation thirty years later, denouncing the ‘sophisticated ignorance’ of 
modern monetary mangers (2004, p. 54). 
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creating more tasks for the polity and rendering private provision more trivial; growth 
is never purely quantitative. Growth is less essential to wealth-creation than is 
commonly supposed; very rich societies do not have high growth rates. Instead efforts 
to maintain affluence need deliberate institutional capacities (for example, those able 
to counter inequality and to tame to ability of finance to corrupt productive activity). 
In the process of resolving the problems of affluence, we find that industrial capacities 
and social institutions co-evolve, a phenomenon well appreciated by the classical anti-
liberals. There has also emerged global excess capacity in most manufacturing and 
service provision, greatly complicating the political responsibility of ensuring 
sufficient employment. It suggests an almost inevitable change in the balance required 
between productive and unproductive activity (the latter including health care, 
hospitality and other currently unimagined forms of democratic engagement). 
 
The real problem for liberalism, then, is that accumulation depends increasingly on 
regulation and the provision of social capital and public infrastructure. The Marxists 
were not wrong about this though it was a point made more energetically by 
conservatives. Political capacities evolve more slowly than technical possibilities. 
 
It may well be concluded that there are grounds for pessimism about the future of 
Australia, among them the continuing divergence between our efforts and those in 
countries where harmful aspects of the liberal tradition are more muted. More 
important is the democratic deficit: elites in Australia have long defied the populace, 
with the result that political development still lags behind the structural requirements 
of affluence. Of course, all political achievement is precarious (even structures are 
contingent). If sedulously enough resented, the politicizing project can be thrown off 
course and path dependency violated. The liberals’ legacy over the past decade or two 
or three has been to frustrate political enlargement and to retard Australia’s economic 
competences too. While stimulatory gestures may be enough to give the new 
government an aura of renewal and purpose, infrastructure spending still seems 
unlikely to be lifted to levels sufficient to guarantee employment or to address past 
neglects. ‘Economic security’ measures may merely cloud a still-evolving incapacity 
to manage our destiny. Political will and appropriate political institutions are 
ultimately required to embed the capacities that are structurally ‘mandated’. 
 
The close of the divisive politics, lost opportunities and ignoble public principles that 
marked the Howard years provides some pause to reflect on whether we want to lock 
in our long-standing vulnerability and inability to really influence the future. 
Ostensibly the chance to re-direct public policy (particularly economic policy) has 
now re-emerged; but continuity is more likely. The conflicts lie not only within 
domestic responses to liberalism but with the nature of contemporary prosperity itself. 
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